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Financial Liberalization and the Brain Drain: 
A Panel Data Analysis 
 
This paper explores the impact of financial liberalization on the migration of high skilled labor 
from 46 countries to the OECD, taken at five year intervals over the period 1985-2000. Using 
an exploratory factor analysis, we are able to distinguish between two dimensions of financial 
liberalization, namely the robustness of the markets and their freedom from direct 
government control. We find that a standard deviation improvement in the robustness of the 
source country financial sector magnifies the extent of brain drain by a factor of about four 
percentage points on the average. However, a corresponding increase in the freedom of the 
source country financial sector from government control has a modest negative impact on the 
emigration of high skilled labor and the effect is not statistically significant. Further, the impact 
of improved financial sector robustness on selection is more pronounced for non-OECD 




JEL Classification:  F22, O15, P48 
  





Phanindra V. Wunnava 
Department of Economics 
Middlebury College 
Warner Hall 502F 
Middlebury, VT 05753 
USA 
E-mail: wunnava@middlebury.edu   
   1
1.  Introduction 
The advent of globalization has led to profound changes in the global economic fabric 
and generated an ongoing debate on its consequences. Two themes have come to occupy 
central positions in the debate: First, as the volume of skilled migration increased 
dramatically in the last decades of the twentieth century (Docquier and Rapoport, 2011), 
there has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in the causes and consequences of the 
brain drain (Commander et al, 2004; Docquier and Rapoport, 2008, 2011). Second, as 
countries have increasingly undertaken financial liberalization programs over the 
corresponding period (Abiad et al, 2010), there has been a great deal of interest in the 
consequences of such policies, especially for developing nations (Bekaert et al, 2005; 
Eichengreen, 2001; Eichengreen and Leblang, 2003; Levine, 1997, 2001, 2005).  
Given the sheer volume of scholarly output generated on both of these questions, 
it is surprising that the two phenomena have seldom been examined in conjunction. This 
paper takes an initial step in filling the void by investigating the impact of financial 
liberalization on the magnitude of brain drain from an economy. We emphasize the 
multidimensionality of financial liberalization and provide evidence that the various 
dimensions have differing impacts on the migration of skilled labor: an improvement in 
robustness of the domestic financial sector, as captured by the development of security 
markets, improvement in the quality of banking supervision, and removal of stringent 
restrictions on interest rates and capital, is seen to have a significant positive impact on 
the magnitude of brain drain. However, an increase in economic freedom in the financial 
sphere, as captured by the relaxation of directed credit policies, credit ceilings, and 
reduced state presence in the banking sector, has a smaller and statistically insignificant 
impact. Further, the impact of former is more pronounced for a lower stage of 
development than it is for more developed economies: while non-OECD countries 
experience a substantial increase in skilled migration due to liberalization, OECD 
countries experience virtually no impact at all.  
Moreover, institutional quality in the country of origin plays a critical role; and 
analogous to financial reform, various aspects of institutional structure differ in their 
impact on the brain drain: the transparency of governance, as reflected by the quality of 
bureaucracy and the level of corruption, increase the selection of migrants from an 
economy. Interestingly, the extent of democratization of a society and the perceived 
credibility of a regime in terms of its ability to protect property rights, enforce contracts, 
and implement desired programs has no significant impact on selection.  
Our analysis contributes to several areas of inquiry: In addressing the 
multidimensionality of financial liberalization, we provide a nuanced analysis of the 
phenomenon itself and its relatively unexplored role in the international migration of 
skilled labor. Further, in documenting a robust positive impact of improved financial 
sector efficiency on the selection of emigrants, we identify a potential second order   2
impact of financial reform on economic growth, namely, through the creation of skilled 
diasporas. Finally, in addressing the interplay of financial liberalization with the 
institutional structure of an economy, it contributes to the literature on institutional 
determinants of skilled migration (Bang and Mitra, 2011; Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2008). 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual foundations 
of our analysis and a brief review of the relevant literature; Section 3 introduces the data; 
Section 4 outlines the methodological concerns and our responses to them; Section 5 
reports our results; and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual Foundations and Related Theory 
The first question we explore is whether financial liberalization has a positive or negative 
impact on the proportion of immigrants from a particular country that are highly skilled. 
In other words, for a given volume of immigrants from a country, do deeper and freer 
financial markets improve selection or worsen it? The second is whether or not different 
aspects of financial liberalization matter differently for selection. Specifically, we ask 
does the robustness (or depth) of a country’s financial sector matter more or less than its 
level of freedom?  
Theories of immigrant selection (Borjas, 1987; Chiswick, 2000) suggest that selection 
depends on, first, the marginal benefit of migration (measured by the wage differential 
between the home and destination regions; and, second, the costs of migration (measured 
in terms of both the explicit moving costs as well as the opportunity costs involved with 
searching for a job in the destination region). Since financial liberalization alters these 
incentives differently for high and low skill workers, and, in fact has different impacts on 
each, the distortionary effects of liberalization (or the lack of it) has an ambiguous effect 
on the brain drain. We briefly outline the basis for this claim below. 
With respect to the first argument, the key to financial liberalization’s impact on the 
brain drain lies in its impact on economic growth. In his summary of some of the early 
contributions to the literature, Levine (1997) notes that “the preponderance of theoretical 
reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive, first-order relationship between 
financial development and economic growth.” From a theoretical perspective, better-
functioning financial markets are said to reduce information and transaction costs and 
thus improve the allocation of resources across sectors as well as intertemporally (Merton 
and Bodie, 1995). This generates static economic gains through the more efficient use of 
existing resources as well as dynamic gains through capital accumulation and 
technological innovation (Romer, 1986; 1990). A subsequent critical analysis of some of 
the more recent contributions available from Levine (2005) reveals a similar trend.  The 
consensus in this line of research is that better financial markets, broadly defined, 
positively impacts growth.   3
This growth in turn is expected to have a negative impact on the net benefits of 
migration across the skill distribution (Vogler and Rotte, 2000). However, high skill 
workers, who are usually better off prior to liberalization, are likely to receive less of a 
boost to their incomes when access to financial markets improves (Claessens and Perotti, 
2007). Hence, with financial liberalization high skill workers experience less of a decline 
in the benefits of migrations than low skill workers do, and financial liberalization would 
improve immigrant selection. 
Conversely, if wealth constraints are a significant barrier to migration, then financial 
liberalization is likely worsen immigrant selection. The reason for this is that high skill 
workers (who earn higher incomes and come from wealthier families, on average) are 
more likely to have accumulated some savings to cover the cost of their move than low 
skill workers. Even if they have not accumulated enough cash savings, their families are 
more likely to own property or other assets that can be put up as collateral on a loan, and 
while well developed financial markets will improve the terms of such a loan, it will 
improve credit accessibility for low skill workers by a much higher margin (Claessens 
and Perotti, 2007). Thus, we would expect financial liberalization to have a worsening 
effect on selection through the cost channel. 
Combining these separate impacts of financial liberalization on the costs and benefits 
of migration, it seems that the theoretical impact of improved financial institutions on the 
quality of immigrants is ambiguous and therefore left as an empirical matter. Further, 
while there is a vast literature discussing the importance of financial institutions, there is 
not much attention paid to the distinctions between the freedom of financial markets from 
government control, and the robustness (or depth) of financial markets. In an effort to fill 
this gap, we use a factor analysis to identify aspects of financial institutions that represent 
greater freedom as opposed to those that represent greater levels of robustness in order to 
explore the question of the economic impacts of financial liberalization in a more 
nuanced way.  
 
3.  Description of Variables 
 
To measure the impact of financial reform on the migration of high skilled labor, we 
estimate the following equation:  
 
(1)  HIGH SKILLit = it it it Z X      . 
 
The dependent variable HIGH SKILLit  denotes the fraction of tertiary educated 
immigrants from country i in year t in the total combined foreign born population in the 
six major destination countries in the OECD, namely, Canada, Australia, United States,   4
United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
1 The vector   contains a parsimonious set of 
source country characteristics commonly used in empirical analyses of the brain drain in 
addition to region dummies for Asia, Europe, Africa, Oceania, and South America. The 
vector   contains the set of institutional and financial variables, and 
it X
it Z it   is the 
idiosyncratic error term. 
Data on the dependent variable is taken from Defoort (2008) and is available at 
five-year intervals over the period 1985-2000, restricting our sample to a balanced panel 
of 184 observations over the four quinquennial periods under consideration.
2 A list of 
countries covered in our analysis is provided in Table A-1 of the appendix and summary 
statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1. The remainder of this section is 
devoted to a description of the independent variables.  
 
Standard Correlates of International Migration 
The vector  contains a parsimonious set of source country characteristics commonly 
used in empirical analyses of the brain drain in addition to region dummies for Asia, 
Europe, Africa, Oceania, and South America. For each of the four years in our sample, 
we include (1) the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, (2) population, and (3) average 
years of education in each source country; the first two being taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and the last from Barro and Lee (2001). In order to 
control for network effects in international migration as also migration policies specific to 
the host countries, we also include (4) the total combined foreign-born population from 
each source country in the six recipient OECD countries, the data again being taken from 
Defoort (2008).  
it X
Prior to describing our variables of interest, it may help to clarify why we include 
the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in our model rather than GDP per capita itself: 
recent evidence on international migration reveals a nonlinear impact of GDP per capita 
in the source country and the incentive to migrate (Vogler and Rotte, 2000; Hatton and 
                                                 
1 Focusing on the six major OECD destinations is less restrictive than may appear to be: The six countries 
considered accounted for 77% of the OECD skilled immigration stock in the year 2000 (Beine et al, 2011a 
and 2011b). This is significant considering that 90 percent of all high skilled international migrants were 
found to be living in the OECD in that year (Docquier et al, 2007). Further, the United States, Germany, 
France, Canada, and the United Kingdom were, in descending order, the five largest remittance-sending 
countries in 2005; together accounting for approximately half of the global remittance flow (Ratha and 
Shaw, 2007). Australia was the ninth largest, being further superseded by Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Hong 
Kong in descending order. For other studies based on the Defoort (2008) dataset, see Beine et al (2011a 
and 2011b), Bang and Mitra (2011b), and Dutta and Roy (2008). 
2 The original dataset accounts for migration from 147 source countries at five-year intervals over the 
period 1975-2000 and may be accessed from http://perso.uclouvain.be/frederic.docquier/oxlight.htm. The 
unavailability of financial and institutional variables restricts our sample to 52, 60, 53, and 59 countries for 
the years 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 respectively. Leaving out countries that emerged as autonomous 
political entities over the sample period and others with intermittent availability of data on the control 
variables gives us our present balanced panel comprising 46 countries in each of the four periods.    5
Williamson, 2002; Pedersen et al., 2004).
3 This is generally captured by introducing both 
GDP per capita and its square as regressors. The potential endogeneity between GDP and 
the institutional and financial variables described subsequently would require 
instrumentation of both GDP terms, which is problematic given the relatively small size 
of our sample. Hence, the potential nonlinearity is captured by introducing the log of 
GDP per capita as the relevant measure.
4 
 
Institutional Determinants of International Migration 
The literature on institutions differentiates between de jure and de facto indicators of 
institutional quality (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), where the former represent 
constitutional constraints on the abuse of government authority and the latter reflect the 
extent to which such formal constraints translate to actual practice. There has been some 
concern that de facto indicators do not reflect institutions in the sense of structural 
characteristics that constrain individual behavior (North, 1982) as much as the outcomes 
of such characteristics (Glaeser et al, 2004). Nevertheless we follow the literature in 
restricting our analysis to de facto variables alone: as noted by Pande and Udry (2005), 
constraints on the abuse of political authority may exist as behavioral norms without 
being formalized into constitutional precepts.
5 Equally importantly, even if such formal 
constraints exist, they are important only to the extent that political actors commit to 
obeying them (Hall et al, 2010).   
The institutional variables used in our analysis consist of three distinct sets of 
indices. The first set of indices capture the type and continuity of the regime: (5) The 
Polity Index quantifies the degree of democracy in a country, based on the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, and the regulation 
and competitiveness of participation in government and (6) Checks counts the number of 
checks of power that exist within the government. By contrast, (7) Regime Durability 
captures the continuity of governance, based on the number of years since the last change 
in regime. Finally, (8) the Government Stability Index provides an alternative measure of 
continuity, using information on unity within the government, its legislative strength, and 
the level of popular support, to capture its ability to stay in office and ensure the 
continuity of declared programs. The first two variables are taken from the Polity IV 
                                                 
3 On one hand, an increase in GDP per capita in the source country reduces international income 
differentials and hence the incentive to migrate. On the other hand, it increases the ability to incur the costs 
of migration and hence, increases the incentive to migrate. Together, the two effects induce a non-
monotonic response of skilled migration to GDP per capita that typically takes the form of an inverted U-
shaped relationship. See Vogler and Rotte (2000) for more on the issue. 
4 We reach the exact same conclusions when introduce the two GDP terms. These results are available on 
request. 
5 Interestingly, North (1982, p. 201-202) himself includes such norms in his definition of institutions: “…a 
set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the 
behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals.”    6
Project of the Center for Systemic Peace and the last from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) published by the Political Risk Services Group.
6  
The second set of indices capture the state of electoral competition in the 
economy: (9) The Legislative Index of Electoral Competition reflects the extent to which 
multiple political parties were able to compete for seats in the most recent election. By 
contrast, (10) the Executive Index of Electoral Competition captures the extent to which 
popular preferences were reflected in the election of the chief executive. (11) The 
variable Fraud reflects incidents of voter intimidation and electoral fraud that affected the 
most recent electoral outcomes. Finally, (12) The Political Fractionalization Index 
measures the dispersion of party representation in the legislature and (13) the Political 
Polarization Index measures the distance between the executive and the four main parties 
in the legislature on an ideological scale. All of these variables are taken from the 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) published by the World Bank.
7 
  The last set of indices capture political practices not directly reflected in the 
electoral process: (14) The Corruption Index measures the absence of corruption within 
the political system; (15) the Bureaucratic Quality Index reflects the autonomy of the 
bureaucracy from political control; and (16) the Investment Profile Index measures the 
security of property rights, based on the magnitude of expropriation risk, enforcement of 
contractual agreements, and delays in payments receivable.
8 All of these variables are 
taken from the ICRG. 
 
Measures of Financial Liberalization 
The indices used to measure financial liberalization come from the New Database of 
Financial Reforms compiled by Abiad et al (2010) and include three distinct sets of 
variables. The first set of indices reflect the absence of policies that limit private 
enterprise in the financial sector: (17) Privatization  captures the absence of state 
ownership in the banking sector based on the fraction of total sectoral assets controlled by 
state owned banks; and (18) Entry Barriers captures the absence of participatory 
constraints in the banking sector such as restrictions on entry, and the range of financial 
activities, the geographical area of operation, in addition to stringent license requirements 
faced by both foreign and domestic banks.  
The second set of indices reflect the absence of policies that prevent key financial 
variables from being determined competitively in the relevant markets: (19) Directed 
Credit captures the absence of high reserve requirements and government mandates that 
ensure favored sectors a minimum amount of credit or allow them access to credit at 
                                                 
6 See Marshall et al (2009) for a description of the Polity IV variables and the underlying methodology. 
The document can be accessed at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf. Corresponding 
information for the ICRG variables can be found at the homepage of the PRS Group: 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx 
7 See Beck et al (2001) for a description of the variables and the underlying methodology. 
8 The risk of expropriation is perhaps the most commonly used measure of property rights used in the 
literature (Acemoglu et al, 2005; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Rodrik et al, 2004).    7
subsidized rates; (20) Credit Controls captures the absence of ceilings on the expansion 
of credit in addition to the absence of directed credit policies;
9 (21) Interest Rate 
Controls reflects the absence of government intervention in the determination of deposit 
and lending rates; and (22) Capital Controls reflects the absence of separate exchange 
rates for capital and current account transactions in addition to restrictions on the inflow 
and outflow of international capital.   
                                                
The last set of indices reflect the presence of policies designed to improve the 
operation of the financial sector: (23) Banking Supervision captures steps taken to ensure 
the independence of the banking supervisory agency from executive influence, grant it 
adequate legal power, and broaden the scope of its coverage; measures designed to 
improve the efficiency of bank examinations; and steps to enforce the adoption of 
minimum capital requirements for banks as per the Basle I Capital Adequacy Accord.
10 
Lastly, (24) Security Markets reflects policies designed to encourage the development of 
security markets, including steps taken to open up domestic equity markets to foreign 
investors. This concludes our description of data. As previously mentioned, summary 
statistics for all variables are reported in Table 1.  
 
4.  Methodological Concerns 
 
Estimating equation (1) confronts us with the following concerns: First, per capita GDP 
may be endogenous and may, in fact, depend on the institutional variables (Acemoglu et 
al, 2005; Glaeser et al, 2004; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Rodrik et al, 2004) and measures 
of financial liberalization (Beck and Levine, 2004; Bekaert et al, 2005, 2011; Levine, 
2001, 2005). Hence, estimating (1) using the classical regression model is inherently 
problematic and we therefore implement a two stage least squares (2SLS) procedure with 
life expectancy and per capita energy consumption from the WDI as excluded 
instruments for per capita GDP. The Hansen J- Statistic reported at the foot of Table 3 
confirms that the first stage equation is not over- identified.
11  
Second, the institutional variables used in our analysis are highly correlated with 
each other. The literature has typically addressed the problem of multicollinearity by 
 
9 We could alternatively include Credit Ceilings rather than the combined Credit Controls variable, but this 
leads to a considerable reduction of our sample. Nevertheless, both our Exploratory Factor Analysis and the 
final regression exercise yield identical results when we replace (20) with Credit Ceilings. These results are 
available on request.  
10 The Basel I Accord of 1988 was a set of recommendations on banking sector regulation published by a 
committee of central bank governors from the Group of Ten nations, called the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. It was replaced by the more comprehensive Basel II in 2004 and the recent financial 
crisis has resulted in further modifications in the form of Basel III, though this remains a work in progress. 
See http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm for the original Basel document and subsequent updates.  
11 Given the inherent problem of heteroskedasticity in cross-country growth regressions (Durlauf et al., 
2005), we compute robust standard errors of our estimated coefficients, making the Hansen J-Test the 
appropriate test for over-identification.    8
constructing unidimensional indices of institutional structure from the available 
indicators (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Perotti 1996).
12 However, this procedure ignores 
the argument that institutions are best regarded as multidimensional, since various aspects 
of institutional character may differ in their impact on economic outcomes (Bang and 
Mitra, 2011a).
13  
Third, the same problem of multicollinearity arises from measures of financial 
liberalization. Again, this is usually addressed by focusing on specific components of 
financial liberalization (Beck and Levine, 2004; Bekaert et al, 2005, 2011; Chinn and Ito, 
2006) or by combining different aspects of financial liberalization into one aggregate 
index (Abiad and Mody, 2005; Abiad et al, 2010).
14 While the first procedure is clearly 
unsuited to our purpose of tracing out how the global movement towards financial 
liberalization impacted skilled migration; note that the second procedure is, in principle, 
subject to the caveat of ignoring the multidimensionality of financial liberalization.  
Finally, the financial variables of interest may be correlated with the set of 
institutional controls, since the adoption of a financial liberalization program may depend 
on the existing institutional structure (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) and such a program 
may, in turn, influence subsequent institutional development (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; 
Bekaert et al, 2011).
15  
To address the last three concerns, we follow Bang and Mitra (2011a) in 
conducting an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) on the set of financial and institutional 
variables. This allows us to identify two distinct dimensions of financial liberalization 
and three distinct dimensions of institutional structure that are orthogonal to each other. 
These five factors are subsequently included in the vector   of regressors. The 
remainder of this section is devoted to a description of this procedure. 
it Z
 
Multidimensionality of Institutions and Financial Liberalization 
The methodology of EFA is based on the assumption that each of a set of potentially 
correlated variables is generated by a linear combination of a smaller set latent factors 
and an individual error term. The hypothesized latent factors include common factors that 
impact more than one observed variable and specific factors that are unique to each 
variable. Hence, variation in each of the observed variables can be decomposed into the 
part caused by variation in the common factors and the part unique to the variable in the 
                                                 
12 Other contributions (Acemoglu et al, 2005; Hall et al, 2011; Rodrik et al, 2004) focus on the subset of 
institutions that preserve the security of property rights.  
13 Also see Langbein and Knack (2010), who highlight this problem by undertaking a confirmatory factor 
analysis of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) to determine if these measures are causally related to 
single latent variable good governance and fail to confirm this hypothesis. 
14 Beck and Levine (2004) on the impact of stock market development; Bekaert et al (2005) on the impact 
of equity market liberalization; while Bekaert et al (2011) and Chinn and Ito (2006) consider both capital 
and equity market liberalization. See Levine (2005) for a survey of the finance and growth literature.  
15 See Abiad and Mody (2005) for a dissenting view on the role of institutions as determinants of financial 
liberalization.    9
form of specific factors and measurement error. The value of EFA thus lies in its ability 
to explore a theoretical structure underlying multivariate data: The common factors 
identified by the method ideally lend themselves to theoretical interpretation. Further, 
being extracted by identifying common sources of variation in the observed variables, 
they are, by construction, free of high degrees of multicollinearity.
16   
The EFA conducted on the financial and institutional variables employs the 
principle component factor extraction method with a promax rotation procedure and 
factor loadings from this exercise are reported in Panel A of Table 2. The procedure 
allows us to identify three common factors underlying the observed institutional variables 
that are interpreted as Democracy, Transparency of Governance, and Credibility of the 
Regime. We also identify two aspects of financial liberalization that are interpreted as 
Financial Freedom and Financial Robustness respectively. The remainder of this section 
will be devoted to clarifying the interpretations of the common factors.  
The variables with the greatest weights in the Democracy factor are the 
Legislative Index of Electoral Competition (0.824), the Executive Index of Electoral 
Competition (0.880), the Polity Index (0.791), the Political Fractionalization Index 
(0.727), and Checks (0.614). Note that the first two variables reflect the extent to which 
the political leadership of a country is determined by free and fair elections as opposed to 
being determined by dictate; the last two variables capture formal and informal 
constraints on the exercise of autocratic power; and the Polity Index combines both 
dimensions. Hence, it is natural to interpret this factor as capturing the extent of 
democratization of a society.  
The factor Transparency is primarily composed of the Bureaucratic Quality Index 
(0.765), the Corruption Index (0.755), and Regime Durability (0.6235). The first two are 
clear indicators of the transparency of governance, while Regime Durability may be 
regarded as an indirect reflection of institutional transparency, since a regime may be 
durable precisely because it is perceived as operating a transparent administration with an 
independent and efficient bureaucracy and freedom from corruption.  
The factor Credibility is primarily determined by the Investment Profile Index 
(0.585) and the Government Stability Index (0.569). The former is a direct reflection of 
the credibility of a regime in terms of being able to protect property rights, enforce 
contracts, and minimize delays in payments receivable from the government. The 
Government Stability Index, on the other hand, reflects the credibility of declared policies 
in terms of their security against radical shifts within the government. As such, it is 
natural to interpret this factor as capturing the perceived credibility of the government.  
The factor Financial Freedom is dominated by Directed Credit (0.956) and Credit 
Controls (0.947), while the other financial variables play a significant though less 
                                                 
16 For studies using EFA, see Bang and Mitra (2011a) and Langbein and Knack (2010) in the context of 
institutions; Jong-A-Pin (2009) in the context of political instability; and Headey (2008) in the context of 
the general determinants of economic growth.    10
important role.
17 Note that both of the dominant variables reflect the absence of policies 
that curtail the freedom of privately owned banks to follow the profit maximization 
objective. This is also true of the variable Privatization (0.392), which ranks third in 
terms of weight. As such, we interpret this factor as capturing the freedom of private 
enterprise in the banking sector. The relevance of this interpretation is highlighted by the 
fact that our measure of property rights in the form of the Investment Profile Index 
(0.331) contributes significantly to this factor.  
The last factor Financial Robustness is primarily determined by Security Markets 
(0.632),  Capital Controls (0.610), Interest Rate Controls (0.531), and Banking 
Supervision (0.510). The Security Markets and Banking Supervision variables clearly 
reflect policies designed to improve the efficiency of the financial sector. Note that a 
similar case could be made about Capital Controls: Restrictions on the international flow 
of capital isolate the domestic financial sector from the global economy and compel 
domestic investors to hold portfolios comprised primarily of domestic securities. This 
may expose them to a greater degree of risk from shocks arising within the domestic 
economy, since any portfolio they can hold is likely to be dominated by domestic 
securities, all of which are subject to the shock. Compensation for the greater degree of 
risk takes the form of higher expected rates of return on investment, which in turn leads 
to a higher cost of capital for firms. As such, the absence of such isolating policies 
improves the efficiency of the financial sector.  
The variable Interest Rate Controls lends itself to a similar interpretation: Recall 
that this variable reflects the absence of government intervention in the determination of 
interest rates. Such intervention causes a divergence between expected and actual returns 
on private investment and this may potentially lead to an adverse selection of investment 
projects. As such, the absence of such forms of intervention contributes to a more 
efficient financial sector and should be expected to contribute to Financial Robustness. 
Finally, as robustness checks, we run the EFA separately for the institutional and 
financial variables. These exercises yield identical factors as the combined analysis and 
the corresponding factor loadings are reported in panels B and C of Table 2 respectively. 
We subsequently replicate the combined analysis using an oblimin rotation procedure and 
again obtain identical factors. The results of this exercise are available on request.  
 
5.  Results and Robustness 
 
As mentioned in Section 4, we estimate equation (1) using a 2SLS procedure with life 
expectancy and per capita energy consumption as excluded instruments for per capita 
                                                 
17 Recall that Credit Controls combines the directed credit variable with the absence of credit ceilings.  
Since the variation induced by the former is already accounted for by including it separately from the 
combined variable, the weight of the combined variable is essentially capturing the impact of credit 
ceilings.    11
GDP. For the sake of comparison, however, we also include the OLS results for each of 
our specifications. Thus, even numbered columns in Table 3 present results from the 
2SLS exercise and odd numbered columns present the OLS analogues.  
As seen from column (2), the principal factor reflecting Financial Robustness has 
a significant positive impact on the fraction of tertiary educated immigrants: on average, 
a one standard deviation increase in this factor increases the magnitude of brain drain by 
a factor of approximately 0.04 and the effect is significant at the 0.01 level. By contrast, 
Financial Freedom actually reduces the magnitude of brain drain, even though the impact 
is statistically insignificant.  
The relative importance of the robustness factor as a determinant of brain drain 
has the following implications: recall that the robustness factor essentially reflects 
policies designed to enhance the efficiency of the financial sector, such as the 
development of security markets, improved supervision of banks, and removal of 
stringent restrictions on the flow of international capital leading to reduced required rates 
of return on domestic securities. As such, an increase in the robustness factor can be 
interpreted as an improvement in the quality of domestic financial institutions which is 
likely to promote a more favorable climate for economic activity in the domestic 
economy and hence increase the expected domestic returns to skill investment.  
On the other hand, the freedom factor essentially represents the absence of 
interventionist policies curtailing the freedom of private sector banks, particularly with 
respect to the extension of credit. While a reduction of state intervention in the financial 
sector will undoubtedly have an impact on the expected returns to skill investment in the 
country of origin, it would not be wrong to claim that that the primary impact of this is to 
make the cost of migration easier to incur.  
The relative salience of the robustness factor then suggests that the dominant 
impact of financial liberalization on the brain drain operates via reducing the expected 
marginal benefits from migration rather than the marginal costs. Further, the reduction in 
marginal benefit from migration is less for the high skilled than it is for the low skilled. 
This is consistent with the findings of Keeling (2007; 2008), which suggest that the 
expected benefits from migration have historically played a more significant role in 
determining the flow of immigrants.      
The second implication is that the depth of the financial sector, as captured by the 
robustness factor has a greater impact on selection than the freedom of the financial 
sector. This is again interesting for two reasons: first, it emphasizes the need to adopt a 
more nuanced view of the role of financial markets in investigating their impacts on 
economic outcomes. Second, if one considers the outflow of skilled labor a useful 
indicator of economic conditions prevailing in a country, it suggests that efficient and 
well regulated financial markets are more important for economic prosperity than ones 
that are merely free from direct government control.    12
With respect to dimensions of institutional character, the democracy factor turns 
out to be insignificant at any acceptable level. Democratic governments are typically less 
repressive and more responsive to popular concerns. As such, they may be regarded as 
creating lower incentives for the construction of grievance, which may act as a key 
motive for skilled migration (Docquier and Rapoport, 2003). On one hand, therefore, the 
level of democracy may be expected to have a negative impact on skilled workers' 
incentives to migrate. On the other hand, if the existence of democracy is taken to 
correlate with a higher quality of economic institutions, we may expect a positive impact 
on the selection of migrants (Bang and Mitra, 2011a). Theoretically, therefore, it is not 
clear what the sign on this factor should be. In fact, it may be argued that it is not so 
much the character of a regime as a democracy but the quality of public institutions and 
policies associated with it that have an impact on economic performance. In addition, the 
extent of democratization may itself depend on other factors, such as the level of ethnic 
diversity in an economy (Akdede, 2010). 
The Transparency of Governance is seen to have a significant positive impact on 
brain drain at the 0.01 level: A one standard deviation increase in transparency increases 
the fraction of tertiary educated immigrants by 3.5-5.7 percent on the average. Recall that 
a high value of the transparency factor reflects a high quality of the bureaucracy, a low 
level of corruption, and a greater perception of legitimacy of the government by virtue of 
its ability to deliver public services. In other words, a high value of the transparency 
factor reflects a high quality of existing institutions. This should predict a more favorable 
selection of migrants (Bang and Mitra, 2011a). To appreciate this, note that an 
improvement in the quality of domestic institutions will reduce the marginal benefit from 
migration over the entire skill distribution, but more so for relatively unskilled workers, 
who depend more on the services provided by the state and at the same time, are less able 
to protect themselves from corruption and other forms of rent-seeking behavior. Hence, 
an improvement in transparency is likely to have a positive impact on brain drain.  
As a robustness check, we include dummies for the years 1985, 1990, and 1995. 
The results of this exercise are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. The robustness 
factor is again seen to have a significant positive impact on brain drain, even though the 
coefficient is smaller in magnitude and the variable is now significant at the 0.10 level. 
The freedom factor, however, remains statistically insignificant, and the difference 
between the effect of robustness and that of freedom remains significant at the 0.05 level 
or higher. Democracy and credibility both remain insignificant and transparency its 
positive impact at the 0.01 level. Note also that the coefficients on both aspects of 
institutional character remain fairly stable over the change in specification. 
We subsequently replicate our analysis by including the average years of 
education in 1960 as an independent variable, in order to distinguish between the impact 
of contemporaneous and past levels of human capital. The exercise is first performed 
without the time dummies and the results reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3. We   13
then reintroduce the time dummies and present the corresponding results in columns (7) 
and (8). While the new variable is insignificant at any level of significance, financial 
robustness retains both sign and significance in all four specifications, even though it is 
only significant at the 0.10 level in specification (8). As before, financial freedom 
remains insignificant and the transparency of governance is seen to have a significant 
positive impact in all four specifications. Note that the coefficients of the robustness and 
transparency factors remain fairly stable over the changes in specification, indicating the 
robustness of these impacts.  
Finally, it is natural to ask if the impact of financial liberalization on the 
magnitude of brain drain depends on the stage of development of an economy. To 
address this concern, we introduced a dummy variable for non-OECD economies along 
with terms that interact this variable with financial freedom and financial robustness 
respectively. For the sake of economy, these results are not included in the paper and may 
be available on request. Neither aspect of financial liberalization appeared to have had a 
statistically significant impact on brain drain from OECD economies over the sample 
period. By stark contrast, non-OECD economies appeared to experience a significant 
increase in skilled emigration due to improved robustness of the financial sector. In fact, 
a standard deviation increase in the robustness factor was seen to magnify the outflow of 
tertiary skilled labor from non-OECD economies by 4.2 – 5.5 percent on the average and 
the impact was significant at the 1% level for each of our specifications. Note that this is 
consistent with intuition: in general, OECD economies may be expected to have deeper 
and more robust financial markets than their non-OECD counterparts and the impact of a 
marginal increase in the robustness factor is consequently less for the former.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
This paper investigated the role of financial liberalization as a determinant of brain drain. 
Using an exploratory factor analysis on twelve commonly used institutional variables and 
seven indices of financial liberalization, we were able to identify three distinct aspects of 
institutional character and two distinct dimensions of financial liberalization. The 
dimensions of institutional quality were seen to relate to the extent of democratization in 
a society, the transparency of governance, and the perceived credibility of a regime; 
while aspects of financial reform pertained to the increase of economic freedom in the 
financial sphere and improved robustness of the financial sector.  
Our results reveal that the various aspects of financial liberalization and 
institutional character have significantly different impacts on the magnitude of brain 
drain: an improvement in robustness of the financial sector increases the fraction of 
tertiary skilled immigrants by about four percentage points on the average. However, an 
increase in economic freedom in the financial sector has an ambiguous impact on the   14
outflow of skilled labor. Analogously, an improvement in the transparency of governance 
increases the magnitude of brain drain, but an increase in the extent of democratization 
and the credibility of a regime have no significant impact on skilled migration. Further, 
the impact of financial liberalization on the magnitude of brain drain differs for countries 
at different stages of development: while OECD countries experienced virtually no 
impact of financial liberalization on the outflow of skilled labor over the relevant period, 
non-OECD economies experienced a substantial increase in the volume of skilled 
emigration.  
An insight that emerges from our analysis is that financial liberalization may have 
a second order impact on the growth prospects of developing economies by way of 
improving the selection of emigrants. There is reason to believe that the prospect of 
migration increases the expected returns to skill investment and contributes to human 
capital formation in the country of origin (Beine et al, 2008). There is also evidence that 
skilled diasporas facilitate the flow of foreign direct investment (Kugler and Rapoport, 
2007); help in the transfer of technology (Docquier and Lodigiani, 2010); and contribute 
towards the adoption of needed institutional reforms (Li and McHale, 2006) in the source 
countries. All these factors have documented positive impacts on economic growth.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Balanced Sample 
Variable Source Mean S.d. Min Max
Skilled Immigration Rate Defoort (2008) 0.39567 0.13863 0.06232 0.73945
[Dependent Variable]
Total Foreign Born Pop. Defoort (2008) 1825090 12800000 0 177000000
Log GDPC WDI 7.57402 1.57189 4.03367 11.10080
Population WDI 133000000 562000000 12116 6460000000
Average Years of Education 5.12490 2.96215 0.04000 12.25
Average Years of Education 1960 Barro & Lee (2001) 3.51616 2.54306 0.07000 9.56
Energy Consumption per Capita WDI 0.00200 0.00200 0.00000 0.008
Life Expectancy WDI 69.94500 7.75200 42.69800 81.076
Europe (dummy) 0 1
Asia (dummy) 0 1
Africa 01
Oceania 01
South America 0 1
Directed Credit Abiad et al. (2010) 1.57394 1.14773 0 3
Credit Controls Abiad et al. (2010) 1.63776 1.10945 0 3
Interest Rate Controls Abiad et al. (2010) 1.84507 1.31493 0 3
Entry Barriers Abiad et al. (2010) 1.82923 1.17472 0 3
Banking Supervision Abiad et al. (2010) 0.85211 0.98809 0 3
Privatization Abiad et al. (2010) 1.29578 1.19693 0 3
Capital Controls Abiad et al. (2010) 1.72183 1.12848 0 3
Security Markets Abiad et al. (2010) 1.53697 1.12627 0 3
Financial Freedom factor -0.087 0.999 -2.06 1.448
-0.131 0.84 -2.041 1.708
Government Stability ICRG 7.42807 2.28608 1 12
Investment Profile ICRG 6.79443 2.47057 0 12
Corruption ICRG 3.12326 1.38823 0 6
Bureaucratic Quality ICRG 2.14304 1.20235 0 4
Polity Index Polity IV  0.47496 7.46416 -10 10
Regime Durability Polity IV  21.96160 28.07190 0 196
LEIC DPI 5.24315 2.19072 1 7
EIEC DPI 5.00928 2.18647 1 7
Electoral Fraud DPI 0.12144 0.32682 0 1
Political Fractionalization  DPI 0.46610 0.31641 0 1
Political Polarization  DPI 0.33624 0.71313 0 2
Checks DPI 2.42028 1.68298 1 17
Democracy Factor 0.09400 0.89100 -2.989 1.197
Transparency Factor 0.16900 0.86100 -2.383 1.943
Credibility Factor -0.19400 0.68700 -2.789 1.443
Number of observations 184
Financial Robustness Factor  20
Table 2. Rotated Factor Loadings (Principle Factor Method; Oblique Promax Rotation Method). 
 
Panel A: Combined Factor Analysis 
Variable Democracy Freedom Transparency Robustness  Credibility Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 Uniqueness
Directed Credit  0.097  0.956  0.125  0.112  0.070  0.008  0.014  0.005  0.043 
Credit Controls  0.124  0.947  0.084  0.191  0.107  0.039  0.007  -0.001  0.031 
Interest Rate Controls  0.375  0.378  0.051  0.531  0.079  0.014  0.058  0.077  0.417 
Entry Barriers  0.213  0.368  -0.032  0.475  0.171  0.034  0.021  0.261  0.494 
Banking Supervision  0.164  0.382  0.173  0.510  0.330  0.153  0.188  0.018  0.369 
Privatization 0.179  0.392  0.141  0.334  0.208  0.009  0.252  0.099  0.566 
Capital Controls  0.318  0.342  0.217  0.610  0.142  -0.043  -0.018  0.003  0.340 
Security Markets  0.262  0.339  0.352  0.632  0.174  0.127  -0.086  -0.100  0.231 
Government Stability  -0.048  0.298  -0.008  0.221  0.569  0.023  -0.024  0.017  0.535 
Investment Profile  0.121  0.331  0.226  0.302  0.585  0.016  0.023  -0.005  0.391 
Corruption 0.174  0.123  0.755  0.014  -0.038  0.072  -0.064  0.104  0.364 
Bureaucratic Quality  0.193  0.155  0.766  0.257  0.136  0.054  0.014  -0.038  0.264 
Polity Index  0.791  0.076  0.329  0.200  0.003  0.065  -0.057  0.070  0.207 
Regime Durability  0.071  0.236  0.624  0.093  0.081  0.010  0.171  -0.155  0.482 
Legislative Electoral Competition  0.825  0.171  0.007  0.105  0.025  -0.076  0.064  0.021  0.269 
Executive Electoral Competition  0.807  0.108  0.108  0.115  0.065  -0.050  0.038  -0.036  0.303 
Electoral Fraud  -0.112  0.111  -0.405  -0.168  -0.080  -0.083  0.242  -0.080  0.704 
Political Fractionalization   0.728  0.132  0.010  0.136  0.016  0.320  -0.047  0.039  0.328 
Political Polarization   0.438  0.109  0.295  0.106  0.047  0.489  0.006  0.052  0.454 
Checks 0.615  0.068  0.251  0.133  0.061  0.374  0.002  -0.153  0.370 
Number of observations     335                 
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Panel B: Institutional Factor Analysis 
Variable Democracy Transparency Credibility Factor 4  Factor 5  Factor 6  Uniqueness
Government  Stability  0.093  0.039  0.665 0.007 0.014  -0.037 0.546 
Investment Profile  0.252  0.275  0.669  0.042  -0.018  0.037  0.410 
Corruption 0.166  0.756  0.013  0.067  -0.055  -0.032  0.392 
Bureaucratic Quality  0.296  0.737  0.240  0.082  -0.006  0.015  0.350 
Polity Index  0.800  0.344  0.050  0.056  -0.172  0.002  0.268 
Regime  Durability  0.051  0.583  0.154 0.070 0.072 0.097  0.614 
Legislative Electoral Competition  0.871  0.036  0.128  -0.039  0.060  -0.042  0.217 
Executive Electoral Competition  0.852  0.112  0.084  -0.024  0.035  0.125  0.238 
Electoral Fraud  -0.015  -0.391  -0.043  -0.095  0.258  0.005  0.770 
Political Fractionalization   0.788  0.057  0.120  0.270  0.009  -0.159  0.263 
Political Polarization   0.448  0.363  0.056  0.452  -0.033  -0.034  0.458 
Checks 0.667  0.263  0.046  0.359  -0.006  0.116  0.341 
Number of observations     468             
 
 
Panel C: Financial Liberalization Factor Analysis       
Variable     Freedom  Robustness     Factor3     Factor4  Uniqueness
Directed Credit  0.945  0.250  0.027  0.0350  0.421 
Credit Controls  0.928  0.324  0.010  -0.015  0.340 
Interest Rate Controls  0.465  0.617  0.005  -0.018  0.402 
Entry Barriers  0.418  0.568  0.102  0.017  0.492 
Banking Supervision  0.417  0.646  0.085  0.015  0.401 
Privatization 0.393  0.476  0.066  0.082  0.608 
Capital Controls  0.409  0.658  -0.016  0.036  0.398 
Security Markets  0.432  0.687  -0.009  0.007  0.341 
Number of observations     568         *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All Specifications include region dummies for Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, and South America. Specifications (3), (4), (7) 
and (8) further include time dummies for 1985, 1990, and 1995.   
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Table 3. Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Skilled Immigration Rate) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(GDP per Capita) -0.0573*** -0.0880*** -0.0543*** -0.0809*** -0.0573*** -0.0903*** -0.0555*** -0.0844***
(0.0126) (0.0254) (0.0126) (0.0255) (0.0129) (0.0268) (0.0129) (0.0266)
Population -2.94e-10*** -3.50e-10*** -2.99e-10*** -3.43e-10*** -3.44e-10*** -4.13e-10*** -3.44e-10*** -4.02e-10***
(0) (6.80e-11) (5.05e-11) (6.89e-11) (5.80e-11) (7.48e-11) (5.72e-11) (7.34e-11)
Total Emigrants to OECD -2.68e-09 -1.83e-09 -2.52e-09 -1.91e-09 -2.16e-09 -1.24e-09 -2.16e-09 -1.51e-09
(2.41e-09) (2.26e-09) (2.39e-09) (2.27e-09) (2.44e-09) (2.22e-09) (2.45e-09) (2.27e-09)
Average Years of Education -0.0152** -0.00816 -0.0163** -0.0103 -0.0116** -0.00540 -0.0129** -0.00702
(0.00602) (0.00692) (0.00629) (0.00732) (0.00541) (0.00633) (0.00577) (0.00666)
Democracy -0.0260* -0.0250* -0.0295** -0.0271* -0.0164 -0.0137 -0.0174 -0.0121
(0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0147) (0.0139) (0.0192) (0.0187) (0.0208) (0.0193)
Transparency 0.0322** 0.0467** 0.0356** 0.0471** 0.0396** 0.0569** 0.0433** 0.0584***
(0.0154) (0.0194) (0.0155) (0.0190) (0.0178) (0.0222) (0.0175) (0.0216)
Credibility -0.00326 0.00270 -0.0167 -0.00875 -0.00494 0.000672 -0.0177 -0.0104
(0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0214) (0.0218) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0221) (0.0221)
Financial Freedom -0.00683 -0.00623 -0.0111 -0.00874 -0.00706 -0.00597 -0.00893 -0.00543
(0.00840) (0.00836) (0.00893) (0.00862) (0.00868) (0.00867) (0.00918) (0.00890)
Financial Robustness 0.0401*** 0.0465*** 0.0332** 0.0416*** 0.0396*** 0.0476*** 0.0371** 0.0481**
(0.0142) (0.0150) (0.0153) (0.0161) (0.0150) (0.0163) (0.0179) (0.0193)
Average Education in 1960 -0.00646 -0.00560 -0.00639 -0.00676
(0.00542) (0.00529) (0.00558) (0.00544)
Constant 0.860*** 1.072*** 0.827*** 1.042*** 0.858*** 1.090*** 0.870*** 1.069***
(0.136) (0.213) (0.131) (0.209) (0.144) (0.230) (0.146) (0.226)
Observations 184 184 184 184 176 176 176 176
R-squared 0.418 0.405 0.423 0.414 0.42 0.405 0.424 0.413
R-Squared 0.418 0.405 0.423 0.414 0.42 0.405 0.424 0.413
F Statistic 9.45 8.265 7.7 6.93 8.366 7.319 6.878 6.184
Robust - Freedom 0.0469 0.0527 0.0443 0.0504 0.0466 0.0535 0.046 0.0536
Standard Error 0.0176 0.018 0.0181 0.0184 0.0181 0.0188 0.0193 0.0199
Hansen J Statistic 5.568 5.832 5.358 5.875
P(>J) 0.0183 0.0157 0.0206 0.0154    23
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18 The unbalanced sample further includes Algeria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Poland, Romania, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam.  